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Introduction: the need for police reform in Ukraine 
 
After proclaiming independence in 1991, Ukraine inherited the old Soviet po-
lice system without introducing significant changes. Basically, the structure 
remained in place, and the first national law “On militsiya”, adopted in 1990, 
while, technically, Ukraine was still a Soviet Republic, did not change any-
thing in the ways the old and then new law enforcement body worked. The 
militsiya continued to function as a clearly militarised, heavily centralised sys-
tem under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The latter and the former were not 
organisationally separated, meaning that the ministry concurrently served as a 
central managing body of the militsiya, with the minister being de facto head 
of the militsiya (de jure, the relevant position did not even exist). The Soviet 
legacy also manifested itself in the way the performance of the militsiya was 
measured. Performance assessment was based primarily on the criminal sta-
tistics, measuring such indicators as number of registered crimes, clearance 
rate, conviction rate etc. (Markovska and Serdyuk, 2013). Indicators of the 
current period were compared to the relevant numbers from the previous pe-
riod, making it necessary to either keep the indicators on the same level or to 
constantly “improve” them, but within a plausible range. This system created 
strong incentives for the officers to manipulate numbers in order to achieve 
required goals and, thus, was geared towards presenting the public with biased 
                                                          
1  The first two authors are, respectively, researcher at and deputy head of the Re-
search Lab on Crime Enforcement of Kharkiv National University of Internal Af-
fairs, Ukraine. Petrus C. van Duyne is Professor of criminal law (em) and visiting 
professor at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. The authors want to express 
their gratitude to Stefano Donati, Presidential Award Fellow at Northern Arizona 
University, whose grant made this research possible. 
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figures from a manipulated assessment process (Markovska and Serdyuk, 
2013).  
 The first major document expressing serious intentions of the Ukrainian 
government to reform the militsiya is the Resolution of the Cabinet of Minis-
ters of Ukraine on the framework of development of the system of Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in 1996. The document did not address aforementioned issues, 
but focusing instead on the development of the militsiya within the existing 
framework. Later, the issue of reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
the militsiya had been periodically raised (in 1996-1998, in 2003, in 2005, in 
2010 etc.) and dropped again. While in certain cases some changes have in-
deed been implemented, the militsiya still largely retained its centralised na-
ture, plan-based performance assessment and other features inherited from the 
Soviet period.  
 We will not attempt to analyse each of these instances in detail; instead, in 
this chapter we focus our attention on the two more publicised cases of re-
forms, namely, the attempt to abolish the traffic police (DAI) in 2005 and the 
reform of the criminal procedural law in 2012. 
 
 
Two cases of the previous reform attempts 
 
The decision to abolish the DAI was taken in the wake of large-scale mass 
protests in the autumn and winter of 2004, dubbed the Orange Revolution, and 
subsequent government change. As the law-enforcement agencies were 
widely associated with an ‘old regime’2, there existed a significant public pres-
sure to reform them. The choice of the DAI was, in many respects, dictated by 
the fact that, being a branch of the public service, it had a regular contact with 
the citizens and was therefore important for image building. At the time, that 
image was bad: it was considered to be one of the more corrupt services. This 
                                                          
2  One of the points of discontent during the Orange revolution was the Gongadze 
case. In 2000, Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze was kidnapped and mur-
dered. In the same year recordings implicating the then incumbent President 
Kuchma and minister of internal affairs Kravchenko in his disappearance were 
published, leading to the so-called Cassette Scandal. Four former officials of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs were subsequently charged with his murder and sen-
tenced to various terms of imprisonment. Former minister Kravchenko committed 
suicide not long after the Orange revolution. The case on the Gongadze murder is 
still open as of September of 2018. 
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image primarily originated from the wide-spread practice of accepting and/or 
soliciting bribes from the drivers in exchange for overlooking traffic viola-
tions. Still, it is worth pointing out that the contemporary studies, while con-
firming a significantly high level of corruption in the DAI, hardly singled out 
this branch of service as uniquely problematic. For example, Martynenko 
(2004), surveyed criminal records of the charges filed against the militsiya 
officers, and showed that while the DAI indeed contributed significantly to 
the number of criminal cases opened against its officers (58 of 528 in 2002) 
and the number of officers that were convicted (11 of 78 in 2002), it was 
hardly the most or the only problematic branch of the police service. For in-
stance, the criminal investigation branch of the militsiya at the same period 
had 99 cases opened against its officers and 22 officers convicted 
(Martynenko, 2004: 79).  
 The reform policy followed on this pressure does not look very consistent. 
It went as follows. On July 19, 2005, the President issued a decree, ordering 
the liquidation of the DAI and split it into two separate services: the patrol 
service and the road militsiya. While the patrol service was indeed established, 
the DAI itself had never been liquidated, and continued to exist (although in a 
truncated form). No official explanation had been provided, but already in 
May 2006, the Minister of Internal Affairs stated that the reform of the DAI 
had been finished. Despite that, in September of the same year he argued, that 
the President meant the reform of the DAI, not its liquidation. Thus, the much 
announced liquidation of the DAI did not happen at that time: it continued to 
exist, although, with some organisational changes and in a significantly re-
duced size.  
 While no reasons were given, the most plausible explanation for not abol-
ishing the DAI, is that due to that lack of planning, sudden changes in the 
traffic police service would have made driving significantly less safe, increas-
ing the number of traffic accidents. This was emphasized by Zozulia (2008) 
in his article on this reform. He points out, that according to official data of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the adopted changes “significantly decreased 
the efficiency of the DAI” (Zozulia, 2008: 168).  
 The second intended reform, that of the Criminal Procedural Law in 2012, 
while not reforming the militsiya directly, affected policing significantly, es-
pecially the criminal investigative branch of militsiya. This reform was aimed 
at replacing the old Criminal Procedural Code, inherited from the Soviet 
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times. In this case, the reform showed a much better planning, in both formu-
lating its aims and drafting of relevant bills. Its primary goal was to make the 
criminal procedure more transparent and fair. It addressed, for example, the 
issue of the officers refusing to open criminal cases, mentioned as a quite 
widespread irregularity in the study by Martynenko we quoted earlier 
(Martynenko, 2004: 79). By making rules of crime registration significantly 
more stringent such that refused cases surface easier and quicker thereby pre-
venting unaccountable discretion.  
 It is noteworthy that the second stage of the reform envisioned the adoption 
of a new classification of criminal offences: there are crimes per se being more 
serious, and criminal misdemeanours representing petty offences. Conse-
quently, the Criminal Procedural Code provides for much simpler procedures 
for the investigation of criminal misdemeanours and stipulates the establish-
ment of a separate service to deal with them. However, the provisions of this 
second stage were adopted only in November of 2018 and will become effec-
tive in 2020. Until then, both petty and serious crimes have to be processed by 
the same criminal procedure, increasing the workload per officer dramatically. 
Therefore, while the necessity and the conditions of this reform were stated 
much clearer than for the first one, its implementation stopped halfway, lead-
ing to ambivalent results at best. In various branches it increased the workload. 
 The history of these two policies illustrate a disturbing tendency of the po-
lice reforms to either evaporate because of bad planning, unrealistic goals and 
problems of implementation (as it happened with the DAI), or somewhere in 
the middle of the process they grind to a halt due to changes in political prior-
ities (as it happened with the reform of criminal proceedings). In addition, to 
make things worse, virtually every change of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
itself went hand in hand with staff reduction, the current police reform not 
excepted. While, admittedly, some units seemed to have been overstaffed, this 
correlation between reforms and dismissals did anything but improving the 
motivation of the officers for further reforms.  
 Therefore, frequent ‘reforms’ that brought few improvements to the police, 
have given rise to an attitude of suspicion to further changes: a mixture of 
scepticism (“it’s just changing a nameplate”), fear for their position and irri-
tation with the meddling from ‘above’ etc., or, in general, a ‘reorganisation 
fatigue’.  
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The Maidan and the current police reform 
 
The push to the current reform came under tragic circumstances. While there 
existed a public pressure for comprehensive reforms in 2005, the events of the 
winter of 2014 made it much more vocal and strong. The events on Maidan 
led to a critical point, where trust in the law enforcement agencies plummeted, 
making at least some reaction from the post-revolutionary government neces-
sary.3 We should mention, though, that while driving policy-makers to imple-
ment police reform, this public pressure also created its own challenges. The 
necessity to react does not equal to understanding of what kind of a reform is 
needed. Indeed, the first measures of the new government look like ad hoc 
decisions; symbolically, one of the first measures taken, in fact, was re-aboli-
tion of the DAI (this time, for good).  
 The objections against the old militsiya system were summarised in the 
policy document of the current reform, Strategy of the Development of the 
Agencies of Internal Affairs, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
on 22 October, 2014. After reflecting upon the role of law enforcement agen-
cies in the tragic events of the winter of 2013-2014, the document stated that 
“the post-Soviet militarised model of the Ministry of Internal Affairs contin-
ued to cultivate an image of an ‘exclusive crime fighter’, whose success, in 
general, did not depend on the public support, and whose efficiency was meas-
ured by an antiquated system of quantitative indicators of the crime fighting”. 
The document also highlighted such problems as “systematic underfunding”, 
“extensive system of internal corruption”, substandard labour conditions and 
lack of transparency and accountability in the militsiya and Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs in general. 
 These considerations led to essential differences of the current reform com-
pared to the previous attempts. The first of them is its scope. Where previously 
reforms were implemented piecemeal, being regulated primarily by the sec-
ondary legislation (governmental resolutions, presidential decrees etc.), the 
current reform envisions a more comprehensive overhaul of the policing 
                                                          
3  The Maidan Revolution is called after the square in the centre of Kyiv, where peo-
ple came together to protest against President Yanukovc’ refusal to sign the Asso-
ciation Agreement with the EU: the Euromaidan movement. In February 2014 this 
led to serious violence with the riot police followed by the ousting of Yanukovyc. 
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praxis, the main points of which have already been enshrined in the new Law 
on the National Police.  
The second difference is that the new law establishes the police as a sepa-
rate body, under oversight of, but separate from, the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs. The law stipulates that the main tasks of the police is to provide police 
services, representing a dramatic shift towards a citizen-oriented policing ra-
ther than acting as an agent of state repression. To this end, a new branch of 
the police has been established: the Patrol Police. This new branch is intended 
to both bring ‘fresh blood’ into the force and to open a window to a closer 
police-citizen cooperation. The establishment of this branch included a well-
publicised recruiting campaign, aimed at inviting young people to serve in the 
police and promoting reform to the general public.  
 
Public confidence and the new look of the Patrol Police 
 
 
 
On closer examination, though, the reform suffers from the same slow and 
often reluctant implementation, as the previous reforms. The most relevant 
example for us is the intended introduction of the new system of police per-
formance assessment based on public confidence in the police, which is an-
other important dimension of the shift towards a citizen-oriented policing. The 
law on National Police adopted in 2015 (art. 11 par. 3) stipulates that the level 
of public confidence in the police is the main criterion of the police perfor-
mance assessment. The law also stipulates that the level of public confidence 
is measured by independent sociological services in the manner determined 
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. However, the regulation by the 
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Ukrainian government that established procedure for such measurement has 
only been adopted in the winter of 2018. Therefore, for nearly three years the 
new system of performance assessment required by the law existed only on 
paper. In the meantime, the police had either to use the old evaluation system 
or come up with ad hoc solutions. This ambivalence is at odds with the idea 
of using the judgments of public opinion as a proper evaluation tool for police 
performance.  
 In itself, the direct formulation of this system in the Law on the National 
Police represents a large step forward. This idea, of course is hardly new in 
the ‘West’; neither is it new for the Ukrainian academia. Publications present-
ing public opinion as an important source for police performance evaluation 
existed as early as in 2005 (e.g., Maltsev, 2005). 
 Despite this lacuna, a series of surveys in the Kharkiv Region spanning 
2013-2018 should be mentioned (Serdyuk, 2018: 45). In 2013, the percentage 
of those who trusted or “somewhat trusted” their local pre-reform militsiya 
division in the region was 24 and 39% opposed to 10 and 13% of those who 
distrusted or ‘somewhat’ distrusted it.  
 By 2018 only 15% trusted the police with additional 40% “somewhat” 
trusting it. On the other hand, the percentage of those who distrusted or “some-
what” distrusted it decreased slightly to 6 and 11%. Asked specifically about 
the trust to their local Patrol Police (ibid.: 50), 11% stated they trusted it, 45% 
“somewhat” trusted the new division; 3 and 11% distrusted or “somewhat” 
distrusted it. While we must caution, that this survey represents only one re-
gion of Ukraine, it shows that the reform still has a long way to go before it 
reaches its goals in building public trust in the police.  
 On the whole, the current reform is not doomed to failure by itself. Never-
theless, its implementation shares much of the same characteristics, which led 
to the less than spectacular results. One of them, arguably, is lack of regard by 
the policy makers of the effects that reforms have on the day-to-day tasks and 
working conditions of the police officers. How do they experience these 
changes? As they have to carry out the reform, it is important to learn their 
perceptions. Another important reason to gauge the perception of the reform 
by the police officers is, of course, the fact that the aforementioned shift to-
wards more citizen-oriented policing depends largely on the rank-and-file 
making efforts to implement these changes in their day-to-day work. This led 
to the research question of how the goals and changes due to this reform are 
perceived by the police officers. 
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Methodology 
 
Questionnaire and data collection 
 
From spring to autumn 2017 a survey was conducted which included the use 
of two data collection methods: 
1. Web-based survey on the Qualtrics online survey platform in spring 2017 
resulting in 194 responses; 
2. Face-to-face interviews during the autumn 2017, with a structured paper 
questionnaire filled by 385 respondents personally and anonymously. The 
participation was voluntary. 
 
The composition of the paper questionnaire consisted of 41 closed questions 
(indicators) with 75 items (generally Likert type ordinal or interval scales). 
The web-based questionnaire included additional open-ended questions, the 
Herzberg motivational scale and personality questionnaire Big Five Inventory 
(BFI-10). The outcomes of these additional subjects are not discussed in this 
paper. 
In this paper we focus on respondents’ answers concerning the following 
clusters of content:  
1. The respondents’ perception of the police reform with an emphasis on the 
interaction with the public; 
2. The respondents’ perception of the police organisation as a ‘fair employer’, 
particularly where it concerns the protection of social and labour rights; 
3. Working conditions as a background, comprising salary as well as the 
availability of office facilities and tools.4 
For the processing and analysis of data the statistical software package SPSS 
Statistics v.25 and Microsoft Office Excel were used. 
 This survey built on preceding investigations carried out between 2013 and 
2017 as mentioned above. In these surveys, respondents from the police had 
been asked to express their opinion about the importance of public trust for 
the police. Now police officers were asked to formulate their perception of 
their interactions with the public as well as their view on the police reform and 
their police organisation. 
                                                          
4  An analysis of the full range of questions will be provided by the final report of 
this project.  
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The sample 
 
The intended sample size was 500, but in the end, a sample size of 552 was 
achieved. The determination of the intended sample size was based on the data 
about number of police officers per branch and a previously conducted re-
search project in 2007 devoted to the same topic: the police reform and social 
guarantees for the police. The approximate number of police officers in 2017 
was 8000 and for the end of 2018 it was reduced to 7.892.5 The number of 
patrol police officers by staffing schedule in 2017 is 1.478, but the actual num-
ber in 2018 was 1.359.6 Our total sampling population is approximately 9.300. 
The number of selected respondents per branch is based on the estimate of the 
general number of positions per specific branch. An estimate is necessary 
here, because the police service in the Kharkiv region does not provide public 
information about the number of actually employed officers by specific 
branch. The approximate sampling characteristics were kept similar to those 
of the 2007 research project in order to enable the comparison between the 
‘old’ militia and the ‘new’ police force (Bielousov, Kobzin, Sviezhentseva, 
Serdyuk et al, 2008). The adoption of the face-to-face paper-based method of 
data collection in the second stage of research was made necessary because of 
the low response rate achieved in the web-based survey. 
 The sampling method implemented in this study is a Quota sampling per 
branch of police service. We use only one inclusion criterion for the subsets 
of participants: the branch of the police service. There is no exclusion criteria 
or any restrictions based on demographic or socio-economic characteristics 
(e.g., age, sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status). 
The sample from the Ukraine National Police of the Kharkiv region con-
sists of the following branches which participated in the survey.  
  
                                                          
5  From official website https://hk.npu.gov.ua/about/struktura/shtat-ta-chis-
elnist.html 
6  From the response for official letter: 
 https://ukr.lb.ua/news/2019/01/16/417300_nedokom-
plekt_patrulnoi_politsii.html?fbclid=IwAR1uQHR-
GfCfeEr75Cq2dLfU3Itj_pxgA65jbEXaj0dq0MYzxqjvWlkciTlg 
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Table 1 
Respondents by branch of service according to the 2017 questionnaire 
Type police service Frequency Valid % 
Criminal police 114 21,3 
Pre-trial investigation 47 9,5 
Department for prevention 46 9,3 
Regional Police Directorate 42 8,5 
SWAT* 23 4,7 
Battalion Kharkiv* 25 5,1 
East Oriental Corps* 25 5,1 
Other division Pol 27 5,5 
Patrol Police 144 29,2 
Total  493 100,0 
    Missing values: 59 
*In the later analysis the Battalions and the SWAT have been dropped after an ini-
tial test: they have more defence tasks and little interaction with the public.  
 
From the reform perspective (more citizen orientation of the police), the most 
important division is between the Patrol Police and the other service branches: 
the Patrol Police is intended to have more direct interaction with the people. 
This branch has its own chain of command and is not a part of the Regional 
Directorates that act as territorial branches of the police at the oblast level. 
This does not imply that the other branches were not touched by the police 
reform. Changes in education and health care are mentioned as well as the 
bringing together of the functions of operations officers and criminal investi-
gators. How deep that reform penetrated into the branches other than the Patrol 
Police is difficult to determine. Some experiments, such as crime mapping, 
have been carried out in these branches, but systematic surveys or evaluation 
of these changes are lacking. Although in the police reform the Patrol Police 
has a special place, we will compare their perceptions and background varia-
bles of its officers with those of the staff of the other branches. 
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Findings 
 
a. Perception of the police reform by officers 
 
1. Understanding and the ‘right direction’ 
 
The first question concerns the general level of understanding of the reform: 
its tasks and objectives as far as the respondents themselves declared to un-
derstand the reform, whether fully, partly or not at all. As this implies some 
scale of understanding, we designed the following levels of understanding 
scale: 
▪ Completely understand the reform 
▪ Understand the reform somewhat 
▪ Somewhat don’t understand it 
▪  
▪ Don’t understand the reform at all 
Naturally, the two middle categories are fluid, but they still represents the 
opinion of the respondent of what he or she thinks to understand. We did not 
examine his or her real knowledge of the reform, only their perception of 
their understanding.  
Table 2  
Self-assessed understanding within the police branches. 
Police branch 
Crime. 
police 
% 
Pre-
trial 
invest. 
% 
Preven- 
tion 
% 
Reg. 
pol. 
direct. 
% 
Patrol 
Police 
% 
Other 
divi-
sion 
% 
Total 
N 
 
Level of un-
derstanding 
 
% 
Completely 33 33 30 36 54 37 168 40 
Somewhat 
yes 12 16 35 26 24 41 93 22 
Diff to answer 26 36 22 19 13 11 85 20 
Somewhat no 20 11 11 12 8 11 53 13 
Not at all  9 4 2 7 1 0 18 4 
Total = 100% 114 45 46 42 143 27 417 100 
Missing 62         
Index* 1.92 2.21 2.19 2.12 2.49 2.29 2.27  
*For the illustrative purposes, we converted percentages into indices on the scale from 
0 to 3 (don’t understand = 0, rather don’t understand = 1, somewhat understand = 2, 
understand completely = 3, in order to prevent dilution of the index, the option ‘diffi-
cult to answer’ was treated as a missing value).  
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It is essential that the police officers across all branches of service have at least 
some knowledge of the reform and its goals as they are the ones who will, 
ultimately, implement its principles in their daily work. In the case of the Pa-
trol Police, a high level of understanding follows logically from the fact that 
this branch was established in the course of the reform; additionally, the train-
ing of the recruits for the Patrol Police included explanation of the goals of the 
police reform. Table 2 provides an overview of the police branches and the 
self- assessment of understanding. As the Table indicates most respondents 
think they have a fair (22%) to a full understanding (40%) of the reform pro-
cess. This score is somewhat veiled because 20% of the respondents found it 
difficult to answer this question. This option was inserted for the respondents 
who do not feel that they can express their opinion or knowledge of the reform 
coherently. 
 Apart from that, most Patrol Police officers rated the assessment of their 
knowledge complete (54%) or more or less sufficient (24%). The next highly 
self-assessing categories are the division of pre-trial investigation (33% full 
understanding and 16% rather well understanding) and department of preven-
tion (30% full understanding and 35% rather well understanding). Both have 
a significant score of “difficult to answer”, however.  
 This self-assessment of understanding gains meaning if connected to a 
number of functional ‘features’ of the respondents: age, length of service or 
kind of police division or education. Is there a relation between length of ser-
vice or age of the respondents? There was indeed a small but significant ‘age’ 
or ‘years of service’ effect on the understanding levels: the group that ex-
pressed complete understanding has a mean age of 30,3 years compared to 33 
years in the category of “not understand at all”: an inverse significant correla-
tion between age and expressed level of understanding (r = -0,117; sign. 0,001, 
two sided). The same observation is made concerning the length of service, 
which as a time variable is not independent from the basic age variable. In-
deed, there is again an inverse relation between service time and understand-
ing: respondents reporting a “complete understanding” have an average ser-
vice length of 8,6 years, compared to 11,5 years for the ‘not-understanding’ 
group and 12,9 service years for the ‘not fully understand’ group. So there is 
a length-of-service effect in the understanding of the reform, but again the 
correlations are small, though statistically significant (Spearman rho = -0,197; 
0,001 two sided). 
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 The following question of interest concerns the perceived change: reform 
without awareness of change does not look very satisfying. However, the gen-
eral ‘change perception’ may conceal the more specific effects on various as-
pects of the police tasks and organisation. 
 
Table 3. 
What changes did the reform bring to your work? 
 Sign. 
impr. 
 
% 
Some 
impr. 
 
% 
No 
change 
 
% 
Little 
worse 
% 
Sign. 
worse 
% 
Hard 
to an-
swer 
% 
Ind.* Total 
N= 
100% 
Organisation 
of work 
21 28 30 7 8 7 0.25 473 
Legal frame 10 23 37 9 15 5 0.02 466 
Coop. police 12 24 37 8 16 3 0.05 465 
Coop. publ. 
agencies 
10 20 47 8 10 5 0.07 473 
Coop. citiz. 9 18 48 8 10 7 0.05 470 
Salary 14 23 41 8 10 4 0.12 464 
Supplies  15 36 21 8 13 6 0.17 469 
Social guar-
antees  
5 8 44 10 26 7 -0.25 466 
Legal safe-
guard 
5 6 42 10 30 7 -0.29 469 
Average  11 21 39 8 15 6   
 
*For illustrative purposes, we converted percentages into indices on the scale from -1 
to 1 (significant worsening = -1, some worsening = -0.5, no change = 0, some im-
provement = +0.5, significant improvement = +1, in order to prevent dilution of the 
index, the option ‘hard to answer’ was treated as a missing value).  
 
The first interesting finding is that on average 39% of the respondents thought 
they experienced no change in their organisation or their working environ-
ment. There is one exception: the provision of supplies. Supplies, in this case, 
mean all the equipment and facilities necessary for the police officers to per-
form their duties (See Table 10). For 51% of the respondents this implied an 
improvement: for 15% a significant one and for 36% only a minor improve-
ment. Still, 21% noticed a worsening.  
 Most approval was expressed concerning the organisation of their work: 
21% observed a significant and 20 some improvement; the Patrol Police being 
most satisfied (65%) and the Department of Prevention least (33%). 
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 The outcomes of the cooperation variables, one of the targets of the reform 
project (cooperation with other police forces, public agencies and the citizens) 
do not seem to meet expectations. On average 44% saw no change: least with 
the citizens’ cooperation (48%) and best regarding the cooperation with other 
police forces, though most respondents rated this change rather modestly 
(24% ‘somewhat’; 12% ‘significantly’).  
 It should be noted that most respondents did not express much satisfaction 
about personal guarantees, whether social or legal. Around 44% saw no 
change and on average 26% mentioned even a significant worsening.  
 Using the index values to gauge perception of the changes by the different 
branches of service, yielded the following picture. Officers from the Patrol 
Police were the most satisfied about changes to the organisation of work 
(0,42), legal framework (0,15), cooperation with other police divisions (0,28), 
cooperation with other public agencies (0,17), cooperation with the citizens 
(0,16), salary (0.24) and supplies (0,22). When it comes to the spheres where 
the majority of the respondents claimed deterioration (social and legal guar-
antees), the least dissatisfied were respondents of the Pre-trial Investigation (-
0,15) and department of prevention (-0,19) respectively. In general, it seems 
that the Patrol Police tend to regard the changes better than their colleagues. 
This also corresponds with the breakdown of the index values by the length of 
service. Officers with the shorter term of service (especially those serving less 
than 3 years) tend to view changes more positively than the officers who 
served longer. This can be contributed to the Patrol Police officers’ average 
years of service: 5 years compared to 10 years of the whole sample. The no-
table exception is the situation with the supplies, where, in fact, the officers 
who served more than 20 years showed the largest value of the index. 
 These findings raise the question whether the respondents consider this 
project going into the right direction. Taken all the respondents together, one 
third thought the reform went fully or partly into the right direction. Another 
third thought the opposite, while 32% thought it difficult to answer this ques-
tion. To what extent this affected the motivation is not easy to determine. Stay-
ing or leaving the police force may be an indicator of motivation. One would 
expect that those who thought the project went into the wrong direction would 
more frequently say that they would leave the service. In fact, there was such 
a tendency: respondents who questioned the right direction also indicated a 
bigger willingness to leave the police in the coming 1-3 years. However, the 
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correlation (Spearman rho) between these variables is low (0,108) but just sig-
nificant (0,025). Indeed, the opinion about the direction seems to yield little 
more than this trend. 
 As the participating police branches may have different interests, we in-
spected the outcomes of the ‘branch of service’ variable. In total, only 8% of 
the respondents thought the project was going into the right direction, with 
little variation between the police units (range: 6% Patrol Police and 9% pre-
trial investigation). 24% thought the project went ‘rather or somewhat’ into 
the right direction, a modest judgement. A large part of the Patrol Police (38%) 
expressed this meagre valuation, followed by the pre-trial investigation (24%). 
There is a confusing ‘knowledge effect’ already presented in Table 2: of the 
75 respondents who said they did not (fully) understand the project, 59 (79%) 
of them still thought it did not go into the right direction. This, however, could 
be explained by the fact that, while these officers do not understand the re-
form, they still feel its consequences in their day-to-day jobs, which they do 
not like or, otherwise, do not see any changes they would expect from the 
reform.  
 It should be noted that around a third of the respondents did not know how 
to answer these questions. This is in contrast to the relatively low percentage 
of the officers who did not know how to answer the questions about the spe-
cific changes to their work, ranging only from 3 to 7 % (see Table 4). One 
possible interpretation of this phenomenon could be that instead of the big 
picture, envisioned by the authors of the reform, police officers themselves 
are more focused on the more mundane aspects of their job. 
 
2. Perception of police tasks and citizens 
 
Having surveyed the officers’ understanding of the reform project and the 
evaluation of its direction, the question should be raised how this relates to 
one of the key objectives: increasing public confidence in the police. By the 
nature of this survey – police perceptions – this relationship cannot be assessed 
directly as the research project does not contain a parallel citizen opinion sur-
vey. Instead, the respondents were asked whether they were of the opinion that 
public trust in the police is an adequate criterion to assess the officers’ work. 
This question relates closely to the understanding of the reform by police of-
ficers, as reorienting policing towards a more service-based model is one of 
the basic principles of the reform.The respondents answered to this question 
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relatively positive: 17% thought that this was “completely” the case and 31% 
“to a certain extent”. However, 20% thought that the public trust is rather not 
an indicator of the efficiency of policing, and 6% strongly disagreed with the 
notion that their work can be adequately assessed by measuring the public 
trust. 
 This is a positive finding, which should also be reflected in the related ‘co-
operation with citizen’ variable as presented in Table 4. However, only 9% of 
the respondents answered positive to this related question about ‘citizen coop-
eration’: 9% thought it “significantly improved” and 18% “somewhat”. That 
is moderate compared to the finding that 48% of the respondents reported no 
change while 18% saw the cooperation worsening (7% could not answer this 
question). For this reason, we combined the two variables and calculated their 
correlation. The cross-tabulation is presented in Table 4. It reveals a tendency 
to rate the importance of the public confidence higher when there is also a 
significant improvement in cooperation as indicated. However, there were 
many respondents who felt on the one hand, that public trust adequately as-
sesses the quality of their work, while on the other hand, that the cooperation 
with the citizens had become worse. Indeed, the Spearman’s rho correlation is 
weak, though statistically significant (0,149; 2 tailed significant 0,002). Some 
of the branches differed widely on this variable: for example, 18% of the 
Criminal Police mentioned a significant worsening of the cooperation but 31% 
of the Patrol Police noted some improvement and 11% a significant improve-
ment. 
 
Table 4 
Cooperation police-citizen by reflected confidence 
Coop. Cit. Sign. 
impr. 
 
% 
Insign. 
impr. 
 
% 
No 
change 
 
% 
Little 
worse 
 
% 
Much 
worse 
 
% 
Diff. 
to an-
swer 
% 
Total 
 
N 
 
 
Confidence 
% 
Sign. impr. 34 19 15 6 7 0 72 16 
Insign. impr. 31 45 32 15 24 14 143 32 
Diff. to an-
swer 
21 18 27 45 27 50 118 
26 
Little worse 9 12 24 27 30 29 92 20 
Much worse 4 7 4 6 11 7 25 6 
Total = 100% 56 108 169 33 70 14 450 100 
%  12 24 38 7 16 3 100  
Missing values: 29 
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We may conclude that the respondents were moderately satisfied with the im-
provement of cooperation and that there are reasons to deduce that this influ-
ences their acceptance of the importance of the public trust in their work. 
However, the relation is not that strong that it justifies the assumption of a 
stronger causality. 
 The questionnaire also asked for other facets of the police citizen interac-
tion, as far as perceived by the respondents. Two questions addressed two al-
most opposing motivations or responses related to the public-police interac-
tion: (1) avoiding complaints from the citizens and (2) gaining approval by 
the citizens.  
 In the first case, we can assume that the importance of gaining trust from 
citizens translates into the professional and proper conduct that avoids evok-
ing complaints. Indeed, 130 respondents (28%) indicated that in their work 
they “keep this constantly in mind”. 114 respondents (24%) said to have this 
principle “often in mind”. Both subsets were also sensitive to what we call the 
‘confidence effect’, as presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 
Avoiding complaints broken down by citizens’ confidence 
Avoid com-
plaint 
Constantly 
 
% 
Often 
 
% 
Rarely 
 
% 
Never 
 
% 
Diff. to 
answer 
% 
Total 
 
N 
 
Confidence % 
Completely 25 12 14 18 6 75 16 
Somewhat 31 38 35 16 25 143 31 
Diff. to an-
swer 
21 28 28 19 47 121 26 
Rather not 21 17 18 32 17 93 20 
Not at all 3 5 4 14 6 6 6 
Total 130 114 116 62 36 458 100 
% 28 24 25 14 8 100  
   Missing values: 21 
 
More than half of the 130 respondents who said to avoid complaints from cit-
izens were aware of the importance of the public confidence (25% “com-
pletely” and 31% “somewhat”). However, 14% of the respondents who rarely 
paid attention to avoiding complaints still reported they “completely” thought 
the public confidence is an important yardstick of their work, with another 
35% of this subset stating it is a “somewhat” important yardstick. Indeed, the 
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correlation of the complaint variable with the public confidence variable is 
low: Spearman rho, 0,153, though 0,001 statistically significant. A similar low 
correlation is found with the cooperation variable of citizens with the police: 
Spearman rho, 0,117, significant at 0,013.  
 Relating the avoidance variable to the particular branches of service, it was 
observed that the Criminal Police was most keen to avoid complaints: 56%; 
the Department of Prevention the least: 31%. This may be a function of the 
kind of tasks these branches perform, however. The Criminal Police, acting 
under the stringent rules of criminal procedure, face much more significant 
risks because of citizens’ complaints, than the Prevention Department, whose 
officers more often deal with administrative cases.  
 A stronger correlation was found between the perception of public confi-
dence and the need to obtain positive feedback from citizens: Spearmen rho 
0,272; significance 0,000. Those who were most sensitive to public confi-
dence (59% ‘completely’) were constantly aware of the need of positive feed-
back. However, 33% who said they rather did not think of public confidence 
still were constantly aware of the need of positive feedback. Between the need 
of feedback and kind of service there was no significant correlation. 
 
Table 6 
Citizens’ confidence broken down by need of positive feedback 
Citizens’ 
confidence 
Completely 
 
% 
Somewhat 
 
% 
Diff. to 
answer 
% 
Rather 
not 
% 
Not 
at all 
 
% 
Total 
 
N 
 
Need feed-
back 
  % 
Constantly 59 28 25 33 15 148 33 
Often 25 49 29 22 23 149 33 
Rarely 13 18 29 23 35 100 22 
Never 0 4 6 16 19 32 7 
Diff. to an-
swer 
3 2 11 7 8 26 6 
Total 75 144 118 92 26 455 100 
% 16 32 26 20 6 100  
Missing values 24 
 
In general, the respondents displayed an awareness of the public confidence 
as a reflection of the quality of their professional conduct, the importance to 
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avoid complaints and the importance of feedback. However, we have no yard-
stick to determine whether this is a result of the police reform itself. The high-
est score of “completely reflects police conduct” with 16% of the respondents 
(see Table 6, first column) is certainly modest. The other variables have a 
higher score, but the correlations between the variables is modest. Though 
there is a tendency, there is certainly no clear pattern, let alone a causality.  
 
3.  Some material and organisational background facets 
 
While the targets of the police reform are to a large extent of a social, organi-
sational and institutional (cooperation with other police forces and civil insti-
tutions) nature, attention should also be devoted to the perception of the facets 
of the tangible working environment. Though officers may rationally recog-
nise the need for reform and express their appreciation of many positive as-
pects, their perception of the working environment may have more influence 
on their motivation than politically correct statements about reform themes. 
Moreover, as observed earlier, police officers tend to have opinions that are 
more related to the day-to-day job conditions than to the more general aspects 
of the reform. 
 This is a broad angle, which for the purpose of this chapter must be nar-
rowed to what we assume is motivationally relevant. Two aspects stand out:  
a. Material and legal labour conditions; 
b. Protection of health and position. 
The distinction is a matter of convenience: protection can be interpreted as a 
labour condition and the other way round. 
 
a. The perception of material and legal working conditions 
 
Obviously, the general perception of working conditions are important: it is 
the ‘mental frame’, within which other perceptions are ordered. In this re-
search, the mental frame consists of the answers to the question about fair 
labour conditions. The majority of the answers to this question pointed clearly 
into one direction: of the 443 respondents 170 said they experience “no” and 
95 “rather no” fair labour conditions (38% and 21%). Only 38 (9%) rated their 
labour conditions as fully fair. Asked for more precision 71% stated that they 
think their social and labour rights are violated.  
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 A fairly strong correlation was found between the perception of the fairness 
of the working conditions and the perception of the violations of labour and 
social rights: Spearmen rho -0,468; significance 0,000. 82% of those who con-
sider their working conditions unfair responded also that their labour and so-
cial rights are violated; of those who consider their working conditions fair 
only 26% reported no labour and social rights violations (with an additional 
18% responding “somewhat no”). 
 
Table 7 
Fairness of labour conditions against  
labour and social rights violations 
Fair conditions Yes 
 
% 
Somewhat 
 
% 
Somewhat 
no 
% 
Not 
at all 
% 
Total 
 
N 
 
Rights violated 
% 
Yes 21 16 34 82 148 38 
Somewhat 34 38 42 13 149 34 
Somewhat no 18 43 22 1 100 24 
No 26 4 2 4 32 5 
Total 38 140 170 95 446 100 
% 9 32 38 21 100  
 Missing values: 33 
 
a1. Getting paid 
We assume that one type of violations of rights impacting directly on the of-
ficers’ perception concerns the payment of salaries: do they get their full legal 
pay? This question was answered negatively by 29% of the respondents while 
45% said they did not know, both remarkably high numbers for this important 
labour condition. Still it may even be flattering, given the finding that 96% 
respectively 94% does not get full compensation for overtime or night-time 
work even if it is compensated by extra days off. But what if these days off 
accumulate endlessly? 
 Income, as a component of the material working conditions is important 
in another way: many officers reported difficulties of making ends meet, as 
presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8 
Salary improvement by ‘sufficient salary to maintain family’  
Improvement Sign. 
impr. 
% 
Insign. 
Impr. 
% 
No 
change 
% 
A bit 
worse 
% 
Sign. 
worse 
% 
Diff. to 
answer 
% 
 
Total  
N 
 
 
% 
Sufficient  
salary 
Yes 15 7 1 0 7 6 21 5 
Rather yes 12 12 9 9 13 6 43 10 
Rather  no 30 33 35 46 22 25 138 33 
No 44 48 55 46 58 63 219 52 
Total N=100% 61 87 177 35 45 16 421  
In % 14 21 42 8 11 4   
Missing values: 58 
 
As can be deduced from Table 8, the salaries tend to be generally perceived 
as insufficient income to maintain a family, even though 44% of the surveyed 
officers report a significant improvement in the salary. On the whole, 85% 
thought the pay was insufficient to maintain a family, whether an improve-
ment was mentioned or not. The Patrol Police seems to have gained most: 
51% of them mentioned an improvement in salary against only 20% of the 
Criminal Police. 
 Not surprisingly, respondents generally declared modest living expenses 
in their households. 58% stated that they spend all their money on basic, in-
expensive goods, 29% – that while their households’ income was generally 
sufficient, it was still difficult to purchase some goods, such as furniture, TV, 
refrigerator etc. 9% claimed that they don’t have enough money even for the 
most essential goods. 
 
a2. Feeling protected 
Another matter concerns the feeling of being protected. This issue has many 
facets, which are part of the general perception of the protection of human 
rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Within this broader framework, we project 
the perceptions of protection derived from specific regulations such as the reg-
ulatory framework of the use of force, and weapons training. Protection of 
police officers also concerns their rights and freedoms in relation to citizens 
as well as their protection in court: do police officers enjoy the same protection 
as citizens?  
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 Going from the broadest protection circle and narrowing our focus, we find 
that the respondents’ perception of human rights protection in Ukraine does 
not reflect much trust: 43% thought the protection in general not sufficient and 
9% completely absent. Does this have any influence on the perception of the 
reform? In focus groups it was mentioned that protection of rights is an im-
portant issue for police officers. These frequently mentioned concerns were 
converted into specific survey questions relating to officer-citizen legal inter-
actions, for example, who “enjoys better protection: the police officer or a 
common citizen?” Obviously, there should be equality of justice, but percep-
tion may be different as presented in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 
Perception of equality of legal protection of citizens  
and police officers: In general and at trial 
 
Equality in protection? 
General protection 
% 
At trial 
% 
Police more than citizen 1 2 
Equally 22 28 
Citizen more than police 77 71 
N = 100% 479 479 
 
The answers to these specific questions point clearly into one direction: offic-
ers feel that in legal proceedings with citizens there is a preferential treatment 
of the citizens. This perception is expressed in all services, independent of the 
perceived level of social protection and the kind of service. 
 One may hypothesise that trust in a fair employer may act as a counterbal-
ance to this bias such that officers may generally feel socially protected. In the 
perception of the respondents that appeared not to be the case. 60% of the 
respondents do not consider the police organisation a fair employer (41% a bit 
unfair and 20% not fair at all) and 83% feel to be “rather not” or ‘not at all 
protected’. 
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Table 10 
Police organisation as employer and sense of social protection 
Fairness employer Fair 
 
% 
Somewhat 
fair 
% 
Somewhat 
unfair 
% 
Not fair 
 
% 
 
 
N 
 
 
% 
 
Socially protected 
Yes 27 2 1 1 16 4 
Somewhat yes 21 22 9 1 53 12 
Somewhat not 32 53 52 20 189 44 
No 21 23 39 78 169 40 
N = 100% 44 126 176 81 427  
% 10 30 41 20   
 Missing values: 52 
 
As can be observed, the perception of not being protected is predominant. 
Even among the respondents who think the police organisation a fair em-
ployer, more than half (53%: that is 32% “somewhat” plus 21% “not at all”) 
have (severe) doubts about their social protection. However, this is only a 
small subset of the population: the vast majority doubts the fairness of the 
employer as well as the prospect of proper protection.  
 Many facets of the police work entail the risk of getting harmed, physically 
or mentally, against which the police organisation is required to provide pro-
tection. As protecting health and safety may in actual work situations be com-
plex we also asked the respondents whether they got sufficient training on this 
point. This proved to be the case: 72% thought they had either “fully suffi-
cient” (18%) or “generally sufficient” (54%) training to protect their health. 
However, when it came to actual sickness, only 4% said that the necessary 
treatment was provided, while 84% said that this did not happen: “fully” 53% 
or “not fully” 31%.  
 
a3. Being supplied 
Against the background of the perception of the fairness of the police organi-
sation it is of importance to take stock of the provisions, facilities and tools 
needed for the execution of police tasks, as is becoming of a good and fair 
employer in the implementation of an important reform. Formulated simply: 
what is the point of reform if in the end you still sit on wooden boxes in an 
unheated office with no gas for the car to do patrols? This question is not new: 
in the 2007 survey (Bielousov, 2008) there was also a question about material 
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provisions of officers in their stations. We provide the findings of 2007 to-
gether with those of 2017, obviously with warnings of methodological cave-
ats.7 The comparison is only partial because some of the implied services no 
longer exist. Despite these differences, the figures give an indication of 
changes over time. 
 
Table 11 
Equipment and provisions of police stations: 2007 and 2017 
 
 
 
Year Sufficiently 
provided 
Partially 
provided 
Not pro-
vided 
Workplaces 
2017 42 41 17 
2007 48 43 10 
Stationery 
2017 16 38 47 
2007 11 27 63 
Means of communication 
2017 18 46 36 
2007 32 47 21 
Computers 
2017 15 49 36 
2007 13 49 38 
Internet access 
2017 26 37 37 
2007 9 21 70 
Access to the police  
databases 
2017 40 40 20 
2007 15 30 55 
Furniture 
2017 22 53 25 
2007 18 51 31 
Transport/cars 
2017 15 39 46 
2007 14 39 47 
Fuel  
2017 15 48 37 
2007 12 29 59 
 
Answers to the questions of the present survey on how the officers are pro-
vided with different kinds of tools and facilities shows a number of problems. 
Only with respect to the workplaces, the most common response was “fully 
provided” (42%); the option “partially provided” was the most common for 
other supplies such as means of communication; computers; Internet access; 
                                                          
7   The 2007 survey covered the whole country and had a sample of 3000 officers. 
Ukraine, for the purposes of the study, was divided into 7 regions, Kharkiv Oblast 
being chosen as a typical for the northern region (Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv 
Oblasts) and was represented by 355 officers (according to the percentage of the 
officers from the region in the militsiya). 
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furniture; fuel for cars; access to the police databases. For the latter, however, 
the difference between the options “sufficiently provided” and “partially pro-
vided” was negligible. It should be noted that despite the usual “partly pro-
vided,” on average 36% said to have no means of communication, computer 
or internet access. For the transport and stationery, the most common response 
was that they are ‘not provided’. It could also happen that there were cars, but 
no fuel or fuel without cars (9 respondents).  
 Compared to the results of the 2007 study, there seems to be general im-
provement, however very modest. Two notable exceptions are, on one hand, 
the worsening of the perception of the supplies of workplaces and means of 
communication, and, on the other hand, significant improvement of the avail-
ability of Internet access and access to the police databases, which can be at-
tributed more to the general technological development. 
 
b. The police viewed as an organisation 
 
In table 10 we present what the respondents thought of their organisation as a 
‘fair employer’, a proposition which the majority of 60% denied. However, 
their assessments of other aspects of the police as an organization tend to be 
more positive. 
 Two questions addressed the assessment of the police efficiency by the 
officers themselves, concerning police as a whole and the particular branch of 
the police, to which they belong. Answering the first question, the majority of 
the respondents thought that the police is in general efficient or “rather effi-
cient” (13 and 40%). However, respondents tend to assess their own branch 
of service as more effective than the police in general (30 and 47%). The re-
spondents of the Parole Police displayed the most enthusiasm for the police in 
general (11% efficient and 56% “rather efficient”) as well as their own branch 
(26 and 58%).  
 Two questions concerned the assessment of the police on the scales of “or-
der-chaos” and “reason-absurdity”. While, in both cases, the majority of the 
respondents characterised the police as “orderly” or “more orderly than not” 
(15 and 52%) and as reasonable or “more reasonable than not” (19 and 52%), 
26% of the respondents thought there was “more chaos than order” in the po-
lice work and 24% that there was more absurdity than reason. Of the respond-
ents who thought their service to be inefficient, 45% thought “more chaos than 
order” is an adequate description of the police system. Unsurprisingly, those 
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who found more chaos in the police system (110) also perceived more absurd-
ity in their work (62%).  
 Of the services the pre-trial investigation respondents were most critical on 
the ‘order-chaos’ variable (45% more chaos) as well as on the ‘reason-absurd-
ity’ variable (40% more absurd), with more than 10% above the average for 
both variables (32% and 28%).  
 The other aspect of the police organisation addressed in the questionnaire 
was the perceived influence of the respondents’ service on their personal self-
fulfilment. The majority of the respondents stated that their job was either 
fully or somewhat beneficial to their self-fulfilment (12% and 60%).  
 Another facet of the relations between the police officers and the organi-
zation is their readiness to quit the police completely or to change their branch 
of service. While respondents mentioned significant problems with their jobs, 
only a small percentage of them expressed a readiness to transfer to another 
police division or to quit the police entirely. 40% stated they are not going to 
leave the police, another 41% indicated that they do not have any specific 
plans to leave. Only 5% stated they are going to leave in a period of a year, 
9% plan to leave in 2-3 years, 4% – no earlier than in 4 years. It should be 
noted, however, that it was the patrol police that showed the biggest readiness 
to leave the police: 9% stated readiness to leave in 1 year, 10% in 2-3 years. 
 
  
Conclusion and discussion 
 
In the introduction we discussed two of the reforms and changes the police in 
Ukraine had to undergo in the past decades. It appeared that the design and 
implementation of these measures proved to be little consistent.  
 The first reform was aimed at abolishing the DAI, the then traffic police, 
widely perceived as a corrupt division. However, it continued to exist: policy-
makers backtracked on their plans, declaring that the goals they set had been 
accomplished – that was a counterfactual statement. The second reform 
changed the rules of the criminal procedure under which a large section of the 
police officers operate. While it was implemented more or less consistently, 
the crucial legislation necessary to support it had not been enacted yet. As we 
mentioned, these were the two most obvious examples of the numerous 
changes and reforms that affected Ukrainian police since the country declared 
independence in 1991. Thus, the current reform that has been initiated in the 
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wake of Maidan Revolt might be seen as ‘just another one’ in a series of half-
baked policies: achieving little but burdening police officers in their day-to-
day task fulfilment.  
 Despite this (justified) expectation, the current reform actually differed 
from the previous ones, most importantly in its scope. It established the Na-
tional Police in place of the old militsiya and formulated progressive principles 
of policing. Most importantly, it placed much more emphasis on service- and 
citizen-oriented policing and the related importance of the public trust. This 
led to a new system of police performance assessment based on this public 
trust. Unfortunately, the implementation of this new assessment was delayed 
keeping it in the state of ‘paper reform’. Currently this new assessment system 
is still under production and may be ready by 2020. In addition, there was the 
establishment of the Patrol Police, largely staffed with newly recruited police 
officers.  
 The reverse side of the perception by the public of the police reform is that 
of the police officers: The present study sought to elucidate how police offic-
ers view the reform and the conditions under which they perform their duties. 
Obviously, a lot depends on the level of understanding of the reform, which 
64% of the respondents self-assessed as complete or as partial. However, irre-
spective of this self-assessed knowledge almost 40% of the respondents ob-
served no change in their work despite the reform. Singling out the two target 
variables of ‘cooperation with the public’ and ‘cooperation with public agen-
cies’, we see that on these variables on average 48,5% of the respondents see 
no change either. When we look at the Patrol Police respondents, they perceive 
a positive change more often, including perceived improvements with regard 
to cooperation with other police forces. Unsurprisingly, Patrol Officers, more 
than the other respondents, thought the reform went in the right direction (44% 
against 31% of the whole sample), given that the very existence of their 
agency was a core part of the reform.  
 Closely related to the perception of the reform were questions designed to 
estimate the officers’ sensitivity for their interaction with the public. These 
questions concerned acceptance of the public trust as an indicator of the police 
efficiency, avoiding citizens’ complaints and the need for a positive feedback. 
Additionally, this set of questions was closely related to the perception by the 
police officers of the improvement in cooperation with the public (48% of the 
respondents saw no changes). 
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 Does this also apply to work conditions, from salary to legal and social 
protection as perceived by the respondents? A common point of these condi-
tions is the perceived fairness of the police organisation as a responsible em-
ployer taking care of its personnel.  
 In general, the respondents were rather critical of the degree of fairness of 
their employer: the general fairness rating of the police organisation appeared 
to be low. Only 40% considered the police organisation fair (“completely fair” 
10% and “a bit fair” 30%) to its personnel. This is reflected in the perceptions 
of the salaries, protection of social and legal rights as well as the care for of-
ficers’ families and proper care in cases of illness. This concerns particularly 
the protection in cases of legal procedures with citizens and protection against 
the own police organisation concerning labour and social aspects. Whether in 
general or in a court of law, more than 70% of the respondents felt that the 
common citizens are better protected than the police officers. This is a feeling 
of uncertainty that may affect the professional risk taking in conflict situations. 
The feeling of rights violation by the employer causes even more uncertainty. 
More than 70% thought that such was the case. Unsurprisingly, the majority 
of them also consider their employer to be unfair. This negative perception of 
rights infringements was underscored by 60% of the respondents who did not 
think the police organisation to be a fair employer. This points at a deep-seated 
lack of trust in the employer, i.e. the state in general and the police as a whole 
in particular, which was shared by all branches, but with the highest percent-
age (77%) among respondents from the ranks of the Patrol Police, the flagship 
of the police reform. The situation is aggravated by the perceived insufficiency 
of the supplies the officers needed in order to perform their duties. This is a 
problem the reform still has to address.  
 This contrasts, however, with the apparent commitment the officers seem 
to feel towards their job. 72% of the police officers expressed the opinion that 
their job fully or somewhat contributes to their self-fulfilment. 53% of the 
officers assessed the work of the police as a whole efficient or “rather effi-
cient”. Assessing their own department, they were even more generous: 77% 
thought it was efficient or rather efficient. Moreover, despite being dissatisfied 
with the conditions of their work, the respondents did not show much inclina-
tion to leave the police. Only 18% of the respondents expressed a willingness 
to quit their jobs. It should be noted, however, that it was the officers from the 
Patrol Police who were the most eager to quit. This corresponds with the 
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greater willingness of the young officers (duration of service less than 3 years 
and 3 to 5 years) to quit.  
 To what should we attribute this attitude? There is no unambiguous an-
swer: younger staff may more optimistically perceive job opportunities even 
in a halting labour market, while older staff may be more pessimistic and pre-
fer a ‘fixed job’. In addition, there may be a loyalty to their service where they 
worked for many years. 
 These observations lead to two conclusions. In the first place, a significant 
part of respondents claim to understand the importance of the public opinion 
for their work. Still, a large part of the officers show ambivalence towards the 
reform, stating that it is difficult for them to assess their understanding of the 
reform, to determine whether it moves into the right direction or whether the 
public trust is an adequate reflection of their work.  
 A nation-wide survey is required in order to gain a fuller picture across the 
country; however, it seems that there remains a lot to do in order to instil in 
the officers a willingness to actively implement provisions of the reform in 
their day-to-day job.  
 This relates to our second conclusion. To maintain this positive momentum 
the police organisation should invest more effort in its relationship with its 
employees: the driver must instil trust in his horses that pull the reform cart. 
It is naïve to expect the police officers to accept the police reform enthusias-
tically if it does not also improve their working and living conditions. The 
other, more general aspect of this is the trust of the police officers in their 
organisation they are working for, i.e. the police and the state more generally, 
to ensure their legal and social protection. If it is the aim that the public trust 
is the reflection of the quality of the police work, the trust of the police officers 
must be a reflection of the quality of the National Police as a fair employer. 
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